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Fish 
Richard A. Posner* 
I have not kept up with Professor Fish’s writings in recent years.  
When last I tuned in he was writing about interpretation, including 
interpretation of statutes, judicial opinions, and other legal texts.  I don’t 
find interpretation an interesting topic.  It seems to me a natural human 
activity that is not improved by being systematized, as attempted most 
recently by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner in their book Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts,1 which I reviewed critically in The New 
Republic.2  I do think it’s important to know something about the 
institutions that produce the legal texts that require interpretation, notably 
legislatures and courts; and I do think it important for the interpreter to have 
experience with interpreting complex texts, from which he or she will learn 
that interpretation of such texts has a creative element—it involves 
imparting as well as discerning meaning.  I majored in English at Yale 
College in the 1950s, in the heyday of the New Criticism, which 
emphasized close reading of complex literary texts, mainly poems, from 
which one learns that interpretation can be a good deal more than a merely 
mechanical extraction of meaning from text. 
But now, after years of ignoring Fish’s work, I have read his 
forthcoming book on academic freedom.  I like it very much.  Fish has 
always been an excellent writer, but I think his writing style has actually 
improved with age; it used to have a slightly bumptious, sing-song 
character, and that is absent from the new book.  The tone does remain 
somewhat superior and dismissive, but I think it is earned, because the 
literature on academic freedom that he criticizes deserves harsh criticism. 
I agree entirely with his preferred conception of academic employment 
as “it’s just a job.”  And the job is advancing knowledge rather than 
promoting political or moral or economic progress, though such things are 
sometimes by-products of academic teaching and research; if they are the 
aim, however, the academic is not doing his job.  (It’s okay if they’re the 
motivation.)  Of course it’s typical of people in any profession to ascribe 
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political and moral significance to their work, rather than being content to 
say that they’re just doing a job. 
So I agree that academic freedom is the freedom to do the proper job 
of the academic without inappropriate interference.  The qualification 
“inappropriate” is important, however, for there has to be regulation of 
academic activity—regulation, for example, of experiments by biologists on 
people and animals. 
I think a distinction worth emphasizing, which I didn’t notice in Fish’s 
book but may simply have missed as it’s completely obvious, is the 
distinction between academic freedom as the freedom of academics and 
academic freedom as the freedom of academic institutions.  Almost the 
whole emphasis, by the “defenders” of academic freedom, falls on the 
former.  They want academics to be insulated from control by their 
employers—to be free to teach outrageous things, to be protected by tenure 
from being fired for incompetence, to be eligible for tenure after a specified 
number of years, to be entitled to bring discrimination suits against their 
employer, to join unions, and so forth.  None of these things is essential to 
the academic’s being able to perform the work that his job calls for, and 
some of them may impede that performance.  Academics are employees but 
act as if they own the place, and waving the banner of academic freedom, 
they often get away with it.  Their freedoms undermine the autonomy of 
academic institutions, fearful of being sued by their academic employees. 
 
